in the usual course of veterinary practice outside of the registered location.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the bill be read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate, and any statements be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is ordered.

The bill (H.R. 1528) was ordered to a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

NATIONAL CHILD AWARENESS MONTH

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to S. Res. 503, submitted earlier today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the resolution by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 503) designating September 2014 as ''National Childhood Awareness Month'' to promote awareness of charities benefiting children and youth-serving organizations throughout the United States and recognizing efforts made by those charities and organizations on behalf of children and youth as critical contributions to the future of the United States.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, and the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, with no intervening action or debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 503) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

(The resolution, with its preamble, is printed in today's RECORD under ''Submitted Resolutions.'')

AUTHORIZING SENATE LEGAL COUNSEL

Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to S. Res. 504.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the resolution by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 504) to direct the Senate Legal Counsel to appear as amicus curiae in the name of the Senate in Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky, By His Parents and Guardians, Ari Z. and Naomi Siegman Zivotofsky v. John Kerry, Secretary of State.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, next term the Supreme Court will take up a case presenting the question whether a provision of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, which affects the official identification documents of some American citizens born abroad, is constitutional. In 2002, Congress enacted a law permitting U.S. citizens who are born in Jerusalem to have the Secretary of State specify ''Israel'' as their birthplace on their passports and other consular documents. Under existing State Department policy, passports and other documents of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem may only record ''Jerusalem'' as their place of birth, not ''Israel,'' regardless of the wishes of the child or the parents.

Although the President signed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003 into law, in his signing statement he stated that, if the section of the law that included that provision, section 214, were interpreted as mandatory, it would ''interfere with the President's constitutional authority to formulate the position of the United States, speak for the Nation in international affairs, and determine the terms on which recognition is given to foreign states.'' Emphasizing that ''U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem has not changed,'' the Executive has continued to record solely ''Jerusalem'' as the birthplace on passports of all U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem, regardless of their preference and notwithstanding the statute.

In accordance with the Executive's policy, the State Department declined a request to place ''Israel'' on the official documents of a young Jerusalem-born U.S. citizen despite the statutory directive. The boy's parents then sued the Secretary of State on his behalf and sought an order to have ''Israel'' recorded as their son's place of birth. Their suit has been before the D.C. Circuit three times and is now in the Supreme Court for the second time.

Both the district court and the court of appeals initially ordered the suit dismissed. The D.C. Circuit held that the parents' claim under the statute ''presents a nonjusticiable political question because it trenches upon the President's constitutionally committed recognition power,'' which the court said, includes ''a decision made by the President regarding which government is sovereign over a particular place.'' Siding with the Executive, the court explained, ''[E]very president since 1948 has, as a matter of official policy, purposefully avoided taking a position on the issue whether Israel's sovereignty extends to the city of Jerusalem. . . . The State Department's refusal to record 'Israel' in passports and Consular Reports of Birth of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem implements this longstanding policy of the Executive.''

The parents sought Supreme Court review, and in 2011 the Attorney General advised Congress that the Department of Justice would defend the court of appeals' judgment that the case was nonjusticiable, but that it would also argue that, if the claim was found to be justiciable, section 214(d) of the Act unconstitutionally infringes on the President's exclusive authority to recognize foreign states. A number of Senators and Members of the House appeared as amici curiae, or friends of the court, in support of the statute.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the court of appeals' holding that the constitutional issue was a political question. The Court found that the case called for nothing more than performing the ''familiar judicial exercise'' of ''deciding whether the statute impermissibly intrudes upon Presidential powers under the Constitution.''

On remand, Members of both Houses again submitted amicus curiae briefs in defense of section 214(d). One judge on the appellate panel found that the plaintiff's argument was ''powerfully'' buttressed by briefs submitted by Members of Congress, among other amici. However, the panel majority observed, ''While an amicus brief has been submitted on behalf of six senators and fifty-seven representatives, they of course do not speak for the Congress qua the Congress.''

Based on its review of constitutional text and structure, precedent, and history, the D.C. Circuit concluded, this time on the merits, that the President ''exclusively holds the power to determine whether to recognize a foreign sovereign'' and that the statute ''plainly intended to force the State Department to deviate from its decades-long position of neutrality on what nation or government, if any, is sovereign over Jerusalem.'' The court found conclusive the Executive's view that, in so doing, ''section 214(d) would cause adverse foreign policy consequences.'' Accordingly, the court found that the law ''impermissibly intrudes on the President's recognition power and is therefore unconstitutional.''

In April of this year, the Supreme Court again granted review in the case, this time focused on the single question: ''Whether a federal statute that directs the Secretary of State, on request, to record the birthplace of an American citizen born in Jerusalem as born in 'Israel' on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a United States passport is unconstitutional on the ground that the statute 'impermissibly infringes on the President's exercise of the recognition power reposing exclusively in him.'''

This case, accordingly, now presents the Supreme Court with very important questions about the constitutional allocation of power between the branches over foreign affairs. The issues likely to be addressed include the claims of the Executive that the Constitution gives the President exclusive authority over recognition of foreign governments, that this law implicates such authority, and that the statute infringes impermissibly on the President's recognition power.

Contrary to the Executive's claim and the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit,